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Abstract
Expenditure on legal services has been rising for much of the last two decades and
has attracted considerable policy attention in the UK. We argue that an important
reason for this increase stems from the introduction of ‘no win no fee’ schemes in
1995 and a subsequent amendment in 2000 which allowed claimants to shift additional
costs onto losing defendants. In this paper, we describe how this may have increased
expenditure on legal claims. We then test for this e↵ect by using a dataset consisting
of a large number of employers’ liability claims to undertake a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) in order to see whether claimants’ legal costs increased following the
introduction of the additional risk transfer in the year 2000. We find that costs increased
by approximately 25% after the new policy was introduced, consistent with theoretical
predictions. As well as providing a rare test of underlying theory (and the first with UK
data), our analysis also points towards the need for more careful evaluation of policy
in order to avoid unintended consequences of reform.
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1 Introduction
Litigation is a potentially costly activity, both in the UK and elsewhere, and an important
policy question in many countries involves who should be required to pay these costs. The
position in English civil justice (and many other jurisdictions) for hundreds of years has been
that (within reason) the loser should pay the winner’s costs – typically referred to as ‘cost-
shifting’. This has long been held to have e cient case selection benefits because ‘strong’
cases can expect to shift their costs to the losing opponent; Posner (1973) provides an early
model that demonstrates this. It has also been recognized, however, that cost-shifting can
have the negative external e↵ect of weakening cost-control incentives amongst claimants;
Hause (1989) shows how this can come about in the Nash equilibrium of a game played
between claimant and defendant. Evidence for both arguments can be found in Snyder
and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995)’s analysis of a short experiment with
cost-shifting that took place in medical malpractice cases in Florida in 1985 (see Katz and
Sanchirico (2010) for a survey). That experiment demonstrates the importance attached to
the allocation of legal costs in many jurisdictions, but the fact that a limited experiment over
thirty years ago still represents the firmest empirical evidence on the impact of cost-shifting
indicates the di culty of empirical testing when rules do not change over time.1 This paper
takes advantage of a recent ‘natural experiment’ in the UK through the introduction of a
rule change relating to the elements of costs deemed recoverable from the losing side. Given
the availability of daily case-level data either side of the rule change, it o↵ers an opportunity
for the use of regression discontinuity design (RDD) techniques which have not been widely
used in the economic analysis of law to date. In the process, the paper evaluates an ongoing
policy debate in the UK and contributes to a significant literature on the economics of who
should bear the costs of litigation.
Expenditure on civil litigation arising from personal injury (so-called ‘tort’ claims) has
been increasing in England and Wales for the past two decades. The defendant’s share of the
cost of such litigation is typically borne by liability insurers. Figure 1 shows how the cost to
insurers of settling claims in respect of ‘Motor’ and other ‘Liability’ claims has grown since
the late 1990s, by contrast with the settlement of ‘Property’ claims.
Figure 1 about here
1For this reason, numerical simulation (e.g. Hylton (2002)) and experimental (e.g. see Inglis et al. (2005))
approaches have also been used to examine the e↵ects of cost-shifting.
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Much of this increase has been attributed by insurers to the increases in legal costs
associated with the advent of funding arrangements where the client only pays the lawyer
if their case is successful – generically referred to as ‘no win, no fee’ schemes. In England
and Wales, these are known as ‘conditional fee arrangements’ (CFAs), and were introduced
in 1995 at a time when restrictions on public funding for legal aid were being implemented.
As a result, part of the observed increase in costs could be attributable to risk premiums
paid to lawyers in the form of ‘success fees’ (mark-ups on costs payable on successful cases)
in order to secure their participation in the reallocation of risk they were thus taking on. In
addition, however, much of the debate over policy in the area of legal costs since these changes
has focussed on the unintended consequences of an intervention made in 2000, a↵ecting the
allocation of these success fees between claimants and defendants. In e↵ect, this constituted
an amendment to the way in which costs were shifted between winning and losing parties. The
concern has been that this intervention weakened cost control incentives amongst claimants
and their lawyers, and a number of policy responses have been introduced to deal with the
e↵ects of this.
Given this background, our aim is to examine the extent to which the amendment to
cost-shifting in 2000, as a form of natural experiment, has had an e↵ect on the trends we see
in the latter half of Figure 1. We believe that this is important for two reasons. First, as
already explained, it provides a rare opportunity to study the e↵ects of cost-shifting rules,
(and the first one in the UK). Second, it allows us to evaluate for the first time the e↵ects
of the policy as a source of increased legal costs. In addition, to the extent that subsequent
policy has sought to address this in several ways, we are able to comment on these as well.2
We return to subsequent policy (including current initiatives) in the Conclusion but, first,
we explain our research and how it seeks to achieve our two main objectives.
The opportunity for our research arose from a reform in 2000 that was a consequence of
the need to marry the principle of cost-shifting with the advent of CFAs in 1995. Such CFAs
require the claimant’s lawyer to waive hourly fees if the case is lost, but allows a mark-up over
these (a ‘success fee’) as a reward for such risk-taking if the case is won. The combination
of lawyers waiving their fees if the case was lost and reductions in the availability of civil
legal aid for low income clients helped CFAs to become a popular means of litigation finance
towards the end of the millennium. As such, they could be argued to have widened access to
2Our focus on the reforms to CFAs in 2000 also complements existing literature which has examined the
incentive e↵ects arising from their introduction in 1995. These have been modeled by Gravelle and Waterson
(1993), Emons and Garoupa (2006) and Emons (2007) and examined empirically by Fenn et al. (2002) and
Fenn et al. (2006).
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justice, though at some cost to users because of the success fees lawyers were allowed to charge
(e↵ectively an insurance premium) in winning cases, which initially the client would pay from
his/her damages. This meant that, while other costs could be shifted by a successful claimant,
the same was not initially true of the success fee. Worried by this new cost to the client, in
April 2000 the Government integrated the success fee into the cost-shifting rules and made
the losing defendant liable for it along with the claimant’s other costs. We suggest that this
move to reintroduce full cost-shifting compounded the negative externality described above
because it made claimants even less cost-sensitive and, as such, further weakened incentives
for cost control. Because the rule change applied to cases brought relating to accidents on
or after April 1st 2000, it meant that accidents prior to this date were subject to partial
cost-shifting (i.e. excluding the success fee), and those on or after that date were subject to
more complete cost-shifting: this is the source of the ‘experiment’.
Although the arguments above are plausible, we also argue that a lack of data has typically
prevented policy makers (and academics) from assessing the e↵ects of this reform – or cost-
shifting more generally. Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995)’s work is
rare because examples of shifts in cost regime are rare. Thus, for the first time, the current
paper seeks to assess these arguments by analysing data on the cost and outcomes of civil
legal claims in England and Wales. Our data are from a large number of individual cases
which started before and after the change in recoverability in 2000 and which were collected
daily, on a consistent basis, by a single, large-scale commercial insurer. The daily nature
of the data allows us to use RDD techniques in order to isolate the e↵ects of the change in
policy on the costs claimed by claimants’ lawyers just before or after its introduction. We find
evidence consistent with the arguments above: costs rose significantly after the introduction
of recoverable success fees, and the e↵ect remains after a battery of robustness checks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out a simple model of litigation
(based on Gravelle and Waterson (1993)) to explain the nature of the cost risk faced by
litigants (and their lawyers) and to illustrate how this risk is exacerbated by cost-shifting.
The following section then describes the key policy development upon which our empirical
work focuses (the introduction of recoverable success fees) in order to illustrate the ways in
which this allocation of cost risk away from the State and towards lawyers, claimants and
defendants culminated in a mixture of incentives that appear to have increased costs. Section
4 presents our data and RDD methodology for examining the e↵ects of this shift of risk on
costs, as well as our results. Section 5 presents conclusions and discusses our results in the
context of subsequent policy responses to the perceived e↵ects of the April 2000 reform that
we have studied.
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2 A basic model of cost-risk in England and Wales
Starting a legal case is somewhat akin to investing in a risky asset: there is a prospect of
winning and losing the case so the ultimate return is uncertain. As a result, factors which
increase the cost of the investment or the riskiness of the return may act as a disincentive
to bringing (or defending) cases. In England and Wales (and many other jurisdictions), the
legal rule for allocating these legal costs typically sees the loser paying the winner’s costs
and this increases the range of costs that a potential litigant may face. Arguably, this has
both e↵ects. In order to illustrate the e↵ects of making the loser liable for the winner’s costs
(‘cost-shifting’) on litigation costs, consider the following stylised civil case.3
A claimant is suing a defendant for damages x. Her probability of winning the case is
q 2 [0, 1], which is a function of the cost (often called a ‘base cost’) invested by the claimant’s
lawyer and by the defendant.4 Using ci, i = P,D to represent these costs for the claimant
and defendant respectively, this probability can be written as q(cP , cD), where we assume
@q/@cP > 0, @2q/@cP
2 < 0, @q/@cD < 0, @2q/@cD
2 > 0 (i.e. investing more cost improves the
claimant’s chances of winning at a decreasing rate, while the defendant’s expenditure lowers
the claimant’s chances, again at a decreasing rate).5
The claimant pays her lawyer fees: fw if the case is won and f l if it is lost. In return, the
claimant can require the lawyer to invest cP , chosen by the claimant in order to maximise
her expected payo↵ subject to the lawyer’s individual rationality constraint. Finally, to allow
for the possibility of cost-shifting, we let ⌧ be the (jurisdiction-specific) expected net transfer
from defendant to claimant at the end of the case. This will a↵ect the risks and incentives
faced by the parties, in the way we describe below.
The relevant payo↵s in the model can now be specified. The claimant’s (P ) expected
3A number of authors have studied the e↵ects of cost rules in litigation. Early analyses are due to Posner
(1973) and Shavell (1982). Our presentation follows Gravelle and Waterson (1993). See Spier (2007) for a
survey of how this literature links with economic models of other aspects of litigation.
4The principal-agent relationship underlying this set-up has received reasonably limited attention in
papers focusing on litigation. Examples include Gravelle and Waterson (1993), who amend the current
model by assuming that then lawyer’s objective function is a weighted average of he and the claimant’s
payo↵s ((1) and (2) below); Watts (1994), who looks at the benefits of attorney expertise on the outcomes
of settlement bargaining; and Emons and Garoupa (2006), who consider the lawyer’s choice of e↵ort under
various fee contracts. Whilst a more detailed model internalising principal-agent considerations is beyond
the scope of the current paper, it would be a natural direction for future research on our question of how
cost rules influence incentives for cost control in litigation.
5It is not essential to sign the cross partial @2q/@cP@cD, though perhaps a natural suggestion would be
that each party’s expenditure reduces the e↵ectiveness of the other’s: @2q/@cP@cD < 0.
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payo↵ from the case is:
EUP = q(cP , cD)(x  fw)  [1  q(cP , cD)]f l + ⌧ (1)
while her lawyer (L) expects to receive
EUL = q(cP , cD)f
w + [1  q(cP , cD)]f l   cP (2)
and, as already said, the claimant solves maxcP EUP given that EUL   0. The defendant’s
(D) expected payo↵ assumes that he pays his lawyer the per period cost cD regardless of
case outcome. This is a common situation since it is harder to define when the defendant
has ‘won’ the case and, therefore, to specify an outcome-contingent fee in the way that can
be done for the claimant. Thus, D’s expected payo↵ is
EUD =  q(cP , cD)x  cD   ⌧ (3)
Finally, we specify
⌧ = k{q(cP , cD)fw   [1  q(cP , cD)]cD} (4)
where 0  k  1 is the degree of cost-shifting in place (e.g. k = 1 denotes full cost-shifting).
Thus, as an example, if q = 0 and k = 1), we have a claim which has no merit and which takes
place under full cost-shifting. As such, we would expect the defendant to make no payments
at the end of the case and the claimant to face his full legal fees and the defendant’s costs.
Setting q = 0 and k = 1 in (1) and (3) confirms this by returning EUP =  f l   cD and
EUD = 0.
The model outlined above makes a number of simplifications that the literature has ad-
dressed: for example, it ignores asymmetric information between the parties, the actual
duration of litigation (including the di↵erence between filing a case, negotiating a settlement
and going to trial) and the principal-agent issues that can arise in more complicated settings.
These (and others) are surveyed in Spier (2007) but the model picks up the key feature of
reform that we wish to highlight: the role of changes over time in who ultimately pays the
costs of litigation. As such, it is a useful vehicle for examining the reforms described in
Section 3 and motivating the empirical work in Section 4. The model also helps to explain
the idea of a ‘no win, no fee’ arrangement, as is now commonly used by claimants and their
lawyers for most personal injury litigation in England and Wales. One form of fee that the
claimant can pay to her lawyer is an hourly fee, which compensates the lawyer for work
done regardless of case outcome. In this situation, fw = f l = cP . This has the possible
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disadvantage that the claimant faces her own costs when she loses. An alternative basis for
legal fees that is designed to address this perceived weakness is to make payment of the fee
conditional on the case outcome (and not solely the case inputs). In the US for example,
the ‘contingent fee’ determines the fee as a percentage of damages won for the claimant: i.e.
fw = ✓x, f l = 0 (where 0 < ✓ < 1 is the contingency percentage). In England and Wales,
an alternative form of output-based payment has been available since 1995: the ‘conditional
fee agreement’ (CFA) makes payment of the fee dependent on the case outcome but the
fee is calculated in relation to the lawyer’s base costs, rather than damages. In particular,
fw = (1+µ)cP , f l = 0, where 0 < µ < 1 is a pre-specified mark-up and µcP is the ‘success fee’
allowable to the lawyer as a compensation for taking on the risk of losing the case. Both the
contingent fee and the CFA are examples of ‘no win, no fee’ mechanisms where the claimant
only pays a fee to her lawyer if the case is won.6,7
2.1 E↵ects of cost-shifting
We can now illustrate the e↵ects of cost-shifting on the costs of litigation. Given our focus
on the claimant’s costs in our empirical analysis, we focus on her incentives when choosing
costs. To the extent, as seems plausible, that claimants and defendants choose their costs in
anticipation of each others’ decisions, a Nash equilibrium framework would be a simple way
to model such interaction. Hause (1989) recognises this and the discussion below fits readily
into his Nash equilibrium analysis.
Assuming that the claimant’s lawyer receives reservation utility, we can substitute from
EUL = 0 in EUP to leave the following problem for the claimant:
max
cP
q(cP , cD)x  cP + ⌧ (5)
Adopting a Cournot assumption (where the claimant expects dcD/dcP = 0) yields the FOC
@q
@cP
x  1 + @⌧
@cP
= 0 (6)
6Several papers have specifically compared the e↵ects of conditional and contingent fees: see Gravelle
and Waterson (1993), Emons and Garoupa (2006) and Emons (2007).
7The combination of CFAs and cost-shifting still leaves the claimant exposed to the defendant’s costs if
the case is lost. In England and Wales it is possible to purchase an ‘after-the-event’ insurance policy to cover
these. This does not change the nature of the arguments below so we concentrate on CFAs as set out in the
current section.
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Notice that the absence of cost-shifting (k = 0) would set @⌧@cP = 0 and render the choice of
cP in (6) independent of legal fees: whatever the form they took they would simply represent
a transfer between claimant and lawyer. The presence of cost-shifting (k > 0) changes this
by making a third party (the defendant) liable for some of these fees. This is symptomatic of
the externality that cost-shifting introduces into the choice of costs, as we now demonstrate.
We can examine the e↵ects of cost-shifting on the choice of cP as follows. From (6) we
have: ✓
@2q
@cP
2x+
@2⌧
@cP
2
◆
dcP +
@2⌧
@k@cP
dk = 0 (7)
Rearrangement gives
dcP
dk
=  
@2⌧
@k@cP
@2q
@cP
2x+ @
2⌧
@cP
2
(8)
where the numerator is the second-order condition for cP (negative for a maximum) and
@2⌧
@k@cP
= @q@cP f
w+ q @f
w
@cP
+ @q@cP cD; this will be positive provided that recovered fees rise with the
costs invested by the lawyer (a reasonable assumption that is satisfied for the fees we discuss
below). Thus, (8) will generally be positive, telling us that a move towards full cost-shifting
raises the claimant’s choice of costs monotonically, ceteris paribus, because there is a higher
chance of winning (and shifting the costs – the ‘ @q@cP -e↵ect’ in (8)) and because, even without
this, the chance to shift costs relaxes the need to keep them down (the ‘q @f
w
@cP
-e↵ect’). These
constitute the negative externality created by cost-shifting, which e↵ectively places upward
pressure on litigation costs. A similar result can be demonstrated for the defendant’s costs.8
In terms of Nash equilibrium analysis, we have found that a move towards cost-shifting
causes the parties’ reactions functions to shift out; i.e. both parties have unilateral incentives
to increase costs in the face of increased cost-shifting. As is typical in Nash equilibrium, the
8The analysis mirrors that for (8). Thus, the defendant’s first-order condition for choice of cD (from (3))
is
  @q
@cD
x  1  @⌧
@cD
= 0
Di↵erentiating with respect to cD and k then yields
 
✓
@2q
@cD
2x+
@2⌧
@cD
2
◆
dcD   @
2⌧
@k@cD
dk = 0
which rearranges to give
dcD
dk
=
@2⌧
@k@cD
  @2q@cD2x+ @
2⌧
@cD2
> 0
The sign results form the denominator being negative by the second-order condition and the numerator being
@q
@cD
(fw + cD)  (1  q) < 0.
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final result will depend on how these incentives interact. Hause (1989) analyses a slightly
more detailed model (with filing and settlement stages) and shows that the externality we
have described causes final Nash equilibrium expenditures to increase with more cost-shifting
across the majority of his simulations. Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder
(1995) provide empirical evidence from Florida that cost-shifting leads to increased costs of
litigation.9 Having thus illustrated the potential link between cost-shifting and litigation
costs we next explain the change in cost-shifting whose e↵ects on costs we seek to examine
in Section 4.
3 Legal fees and cost-shifting: Recoverable success fees
in England and Wales
Until 1995, the commonest means of paying for personal injury litigation in England and
Wales were privately financed hourly fees, or State-sponsored legal aid. The latter was
available to litigants who met criteria relating to their means and the merits of their case.
By covering the expenses of such claimants, legal aid both insured their risk and protected
them against the incentives for cost increases that we have described. At the same time,
however, unless strong control and incentive mechanisms were in place, the State was left
exposed to these same problems and while it might reasonably be regarded as an e cient
risk bearer (Arrow and Lind (1970)), expenditure control actually faced several di culties—a
point made by Gray et al. (1996). Well documented expenditure increases led to numerous
attempts to control legal aid expenditure during the early 1990s (Bevan et al. (1994); Gray
et al. (1999)). Initially, these involved the use of fixed price contracts to force legal aid
lawyers to internalise the costs of o↵ering legally aided services. By 1999, however, the
Access to Justice Act was proposing limits to the scope of legal aid, by removing personal
injury cases (except medical negligence ones) from the scheme.10 In pure financial terms this
9The potential for such an externality has led to a number of proposals to amend cost-shifting rules in
order to contain costs. For example, Garoupa (2009) considers whether requiring the claimant to sink upfront
costs may reduce the incentive to increase expenditures at the margin as the case proceeds. He shows that
the overall result depends on the interplay between incentives to start a case and whether to take it all the
way to trial. Alternatively, Fenn and Rickman (2011) look at whether regulating costs may help address the
problem. Of course, the extent of the need for such policies depends on the empirical size of the externality
e↵ect, to which we next turn.
10The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of O↵enders Act (2012) has since removed almost all civil
legal aid from this remaining area of personal injury litigation on the grounds that experience with CFAs is
now mature enough to allow the private sector to shoulder the cost risk that can occur in these potentially
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Table 1: Payo↵s under two regimes
Agent Regime A Regime B
Claimant qA(x  µAcAP )  (1  qA)cAD qBx  (1  qB)cBD
Claimant’s lawyer qA(1 + µA)cAP   cAP qB(1 + µB)cBP   cBP
Defendant  qA(x+ cAP + cAD)  qB[x+ (1 + µ
B)cBP +cBD]
policy succeeded in capping (though not controlling) legal aid expenditure and, therefore,
shifting responsibility for meeting legal expenditure to the private sector.
The result of this policy was a growth in the importance of CFAs, which had come into
being as a result of the Access to Justice Act 1995, ending years of debate (mostly critical)
about whether ‘no win, no fee’ arrangements should be available in England and Wales (see
Rickman (1994)). Policy intervention did not end here, however, and the subsequent limiting
of legal aid prompted an assessment of whether the net e↵ect of new funding arrangements
still promoted access to justice through a↵ordable legal services. The Government concluded
that this was not the case because successful claimants had to pay the success fee (µcP ) from
their damages, possibly deterring some from initiating legal proceedings. ‘Recoverability’ of
the success fee was introduced to prevent this and it is this policy intervention that we seek
to analyse. By making the losing defendant responsible for this additional component of cost,
we suggest that recoverability e↵ectively increased the extent of cost-shifting in England and
Wales, with potential consequences for litigation costs.
We first explain the policy of ‘recoverability’ in more detail, with the aid of Table 1. This
presents two policy regimes (before recoverability, Regime A; and after, Regime B) and shows
how risk and incentives were shifted by the movement from one to the other. The table sets
k = 1 (as we are explicitly considering policy towards litigation in England and Wales) to
present the payo↵s received by claimants, lawyers and defendants. Some of the variables are
indexed by ‘A’ and ‘B’ in recognition of the fact that their values may change as we move
across the two regimes.
Regime A This is the regime that was introduced in 1995. As we have seen, prior to this,
personal injury litigation was largely funded by a mixture of hourly fees and legal aid
so the introduction of CFAs allowed those using the former to shift some risk onto
large cases.
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their lawyer and lower the threat of a negative payo↵. When legal aid was removed
from most types of personal injury claim following the Access to Justice Act 1999, this
further incentivised the use of CFAs (now to shift cost risk previously borne by the
State). In recognition of the fact that the lawyer also bore a new risk here, the CFA
allowed him to charge a pre-specified mark-up (a ‘success fee’, µcP ) on fees. Thus,
as we have seen, fw = (1 + µA)cAP and f
l = 0. E↵ectively, µAcAP was the insurance
premium paid by the claimant for o✏oading her cost risk onto her lawyer. The entries
in Regime A of Table 1 are thus (5) and (3) with k = 1 and ⌧ = qAcAP   (1  qA)cAD.
Overall, Regime A distributed risk from the State to lawyers and clients in the case
of claims that would previously have attracted legal aid, while redistributing it from
clients to lawyers in the case of non-legal aid cases. Claimants had incentives to monitor
their lawyers’ base costs to the extent that they ran the risk of facing EUP  0.
Regime B In 2000, amid concerns that (some) claimants may still be deterred from liti-
gating by the cost of the success fees in Regime A, ‘recoverability’ was introduced.11
This made the success fee recoverable from a losing defendant, in line with other costs
under cost-shifting, and reducing her downside risk. The result is depicted in Table 1,
where ⌧ = qB[(1+µB)cBP ]  (1  qB)cBD in (5) and (3). As the table shows, the claimant
received the intended benefit from this, while her lawyer was una↵ected by the change
(the term with the bracket above it in Regime A is transferred directly to the defen-
dant in Regime B – see the over-bracketed term in Regime B; perhaps reflecting the
continued need to encourage supply in the face of the additional risk since the removal
of legal aid and introduction of CFAs). By contrast, the defendant was worse o↵ to
the tune of the success fees shifted to him if the claim was successful and because the
claimant’s incentives to monitor her lawyer were diluted by the reduced chance of a
negative payo↵, while the lawyer’s incentive for cost-control were not altered.
This brief account indicates how policy towards CFAs shifted additional costs onto the de-
fendant from 2000. When coupled with the removal of monitoring incentives on the claimant’s
side, the move to Regime B seems likely to have exacerbated the negative externality de-
scribed in Section 2, leading to increases in the costs incurred by claimants on their cases.
We now seek to test this hypothesis.
11In fact, the Access to Justice Act of 1999 formally introduced recoverability but it was not implemented
until April 2000.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Econometric strategy
We now wish to examine the empirical e↵ects of the changes in civil procedure we have
outlined above. Specifically we aim to evaluate the impact of the shift from Regime A to
Regime B on base costs, as described in Section 3. We are fortunate in having available a
consistent set of claims data from an insurer with a long-standing presence in the employers’
liability (EL) insurance market.12 The dataset includes all EL claims made against the
insurer’s policyholders and completed between January 1997 and December 2010. It includes
information on the date of the accident, the date of the subsequent claim, and its closure,
as well as the amount of damages agreed (if any) and a breakdown of the costs recovered on
losing claims (base costs agreed, and success fees paid where relevant). This means that we
are able to track the outcomes of 95,976 insurer’s EL accident claims closed over a 13 year
period.
Exploiting the time dimension of our dataset, which includes significant numbers of EL
claims reported on a daily basis, we are able to identify the impact of the 2000 reform using
a Regression Discontinuity design (RDD, see Lee and Lemieux (2010)). Using this approach
we are able to compare the ultimate outcomes of claims arising from accidents occurring
just before and just after April 1st 2000, the date at which success fees became recoverable
from the defendant. The identification stems from the assumptions that the same types of
accidents occur in a small window around the reform date and no other relevant reforms
took place in the same window. If these conditions are met, it means we are comparing the
same type of accidents, which are however governed by di↵erent rules of civil procedure. The
di↵erence, if any, in solicitors’ base costs detected just before and just after the introduction
of the reform is therefore associated with the new rules.
Considering Regime B as the treatment, the variable that assigns each accident to the
treatment is the accident date, which represents our running variable. We use a parametric
RDD specification with a very flexible (i.e. high order polynomial) functional form for the
control function in the running variable. In particular, for each accident a we regress the
base costs recovered by the claimant’s solicitor, and the damages paid to the claimant, on a
polynomial function, p, of the distance between the accident date (ta) from the reform date
(t0). Distancea is a normalized measure (i.e., ta   t0), so it is equal to zero for the date of
12Employers liability claims constitute an important share of the personal injury litigation market. For
instance, around the time of our study (in 2000), 219,183 new EL claims were started and this constituted
29.7% of all claims, as registered with the Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) that year.
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the reform and it takes positive values for each day after it and negative values for each day
before it. More formally, we estimate the following model:
Costsa = ↵ + p[Distancea] +  Regime B + "a (9)
where Costsa is the base costs recovered in respect of accident a,   is the treatment coe cient,
and the baseline specification of p is a fifth grade polynomial, to which we add a sixth and
a seventh grade specification as part of several sensitivity tests. The treatment, Regime B,
is a dummy equal to one if accident a occurred after the reform date (i.e., if Distance is
greater than zero), and equal to zero otherwise. Even if the control function p is correctly
specified, in order to give a causal interpretation to the estimated coe cient,  ˆ, we need
to make two further assumptions. First, there must be no discontinuity in the distribution
of accident dates in the vicinity of the reform date, which is required to demonstrate lack
of manipulation. We can easily check this assumption by running a McCrary density test
(McCrary (2008)). Figure 2 shows the results of the density test around the reform date,
indicating the lack of manipulation.
Figure 2, about here
Second, we need to assume that no other relevant policy was enforced on the same date
as Regime B was introduced. As far as we are aware, this condition also holds. Nevertheless,
to be sure that no unrelated factors caused shifts in case value or case strength at the reform
date we also run similar RDD specifications for Damagesa (the agreed amount of damages
in respect of accident a) and Pr(Success)a (a latent variable captured by a binary indicator
taking the value 1 if the case is won by the claimant, and zero otherwise):
Damagesa = ↵ + p[Distancea] +  Regime B + "a (10)
Pr(Success)a = ↵ + p[Distancea] +  Regime B + "a (11)
For all three outcome measures, our RDD estimations compare treated (Regime B) and con-
trol (Regime A) claims that are equal in respect of both observable and unobservable dimen-
sions. As a further robustness check, for each outcome (Costsa, Damagesa, Pr(Success)a)
we estimate the impact of the reform using a local linear regression (LLR) approach. In an
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interval [t0-h, t0+h], we fit a linear function on either sides of the threshold13:
Outcomea = ↵ +  Regime B +  Distancea +  Distancea ⇥Regime B + "a (12)
4.2 Descriptive statistics
In order to implement our RD design, we first restrict our analysis to a homogenous sample
of observations. Out of 95,976 reported accidents, we select the 82,203 accidental injuries,
dropping both illnesses and special injuries such as those associated with fires and those
with unknown nature.14 Then, we check whether there is an uneven distribution of accidents
across the weekdays, given the nature of EL insurance claims arising from accidents at work.15
As expected, there are significantly fewer accidents reported on Saturdays and Sundays.16
Given this systematic di↵erence, we drop weekend accident claims from our dataset, leaving
a sample of 71,201 claims. The reform date, April 1st, 2000, was a Saturday, and we therefore
construct a running variable imputing the reform date to the first weekday after the reform
(i.e. Monday April 3rd).
We further restrict the sample to those observations in the neighbourhood of the reform.
We consider accidents which occurred in a 10-month range around the date of the reform;
that is, accidents occurring in the five months before April 1st and the five months after that
day (i.e. ignoring weekends, this yields a window of approximately 110 working days either
side of April 1st). We then exclude claims which take longer than two years to reach an
outcome. This is because our dataset consists of all claims which have reached an outcome
by December 2010; if we fail to restrict the duration of claims in our analysis, it will be
inevitable that those claims arising from later accident dates within our observation window
will have had less time to reach an outcome than those claims arising from earlier accident
dates. This would create a bias in favour of lower costs and damages in the post-reform
period.17
13In the case of Pr(Success)a we estimate a probit regression using a binary indicator for a successful
outcome, whereas for Costsa and Damagesa we estimate using OLS with robust standard errors. Each
version of (12) uses the method in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) to determine the optimal interval, h.
14Accidental injury is defined as alternative to working illness. We ran our RDD model using the nature
of the accident as a dependent variable and we did not find any impact of the reform on the distribution of
the types of accident before or after it.
15We also ran an equivalent check across the months of the year. The purpose was to check whether there
were fewer accidents in December or over the summer. We did not detect any anomaly.
16The same is true for accidents that occurred on Fridays, compared to the other working days.
17While a restriction on the duration of claims does avoid truncation bias, we are aware that the proportion
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Finally, we drop the claims with damages lower than £1,000 and higher than £15,000.
The rationale is related to the Civil Procedure Rules that came into force on 26th April 1999.
They provided for three di↵erent ‘tracks’, as they were known, to which the Courts would
allocate claims. Choice of track depended, in the main, on the value claimed and the length
of time it might take to be heard at trial.18 By focusing on claims with damages between
£1,000 and £15,000 we are using only claims which are run under the Fast Track process
and we are therefore comparing like with like. This final step allows us to work on a more
homogenous sample of cases.
The final sample contains 901 claims for EL covered accidents which occurred between
Monday November 1st, 1999 and Friday September 1st, 2000. Table 2 reports the descriptive
statistics.
Table 2, about here
Our main focus of interest is on base costs for settled claims – i.e. for those claims where
a payment has been made and costs agreed in settlement of the claim within the two-year
window.19 Moreover, because it seems likely that base costs will be positively correlated
with case value, to check for any potential confounding e↵ect we also explore whether any
change in damages was evident for claims settling in respect of accidents occurring after
the reform date. Finally, as explained above, we also focus on the probability of success to
determine whether it is random across the reform date using a binary dependent variable,
which takes value 1 when the claim is successful (i.e. paid) and zero otherwise. Evidence of
non-randomness of the incidence of paid claims would be seen as an indication of a change
in the willingness of solicitors to pursue claims further in the hope of a successful outcome
rather than abandon them. This could in turn indicate a change in the selection of claims
of claims that settle within the fixed two year window can change over time. Indeed, the legal process ‘stalled’
during a period beyond the introduction of recoverability, for reasons discussed in Fenn and Rickman (2011).
We therefore tested to confirm that the proportion of claims settling within two years was no di↵erent in our
estimation windows either side of the reform date. Results are available from the authors.
18Claims are allocated to their respective track once a defendant files a defense at Court, and once the
Court has asked the parties to state what directions they require the Court to make to take a case to trial.
The general rule is the smaller the value of the claim the less a successful litigant can recover from her
opponent in respect of his legal costs outlay. In the Fast Track the rules realistically limited recovery of the
costs of a party’s representative attending at trial, even if that party was entirely successful. Typically a Fast
Track cost award would not cover the attendance by anybody but the barrister conducting the trial and even
then the barrister’s fees that were recoverable under the Fast Track regime might be much less than actually
incurred.
19See Table A1 in the Appendix for the definition of the variables.
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in relation to their case strength, and would, if present, be another potentially confounding
influence on base costs. Since the probability of success is assessed using a binary variable
which is equal to 1 in case of positive damages and zero otherwise, when we estimate (11)
we keep all the observations in the November 1st, 1999 – September 1st, 2000 interval (i.e.,
we do not drop observations with damages below £1,000). This means we are testing (11)
on a sample of 1,319 observations.
4.3 Results
Results of the estimation of equations 9–11 are shown in Tables 3–5 – in particular, we present
the estimated values of  , the coe cient on the dummy for Regime B. We estimate the models
using parametric RDD specifications with a flexible functional form for the control function
in the running variable (the fifth, sixth, and seventh polynomial as control functions). We
also add a local linear regression model with optimal bandwidth (h, also reported); this allows
for a spline linear control function in a smaller interval around the reform date, chosen in
line with the approach in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). For each specification, we test
the robustness of the results shown in Panel A to the inclusion of weekdays dummies and
we report the results in Panel B. The main results on base costs indicate that these were
significantly higher for accidents with dates after the reform was implemented. According
to the baseline estimate, fifth order polynomial, (Panel B) the reform increases base costs
by about 22% with respect to the pre-reform average value and the magnitude of the e↵ect
is similar in the other specifications (22% in the sixth, 28% in the seventh, and 26% in the
local linear specification). However, the subsidiary results on damages and the probability
of success are not significant; as explained above, this seems to rule out the possibility that
there was a major shift in either case value or the case selection behavior of lawyers under
Regime B.
Tables 3, 4, and 5, about here
The e↵ect on base costs reported in Table 3 is confirmed by the graphical analysis pre-
sented in Figure 3, where the impact of the reform is estimated using a spline seventh order
polynomial approximation and each scatter dot represents either daily (white dots) and
weekly (black dots) averages of the dependent variable. The jump around the reform date
shows a higher level of base costs in the post-reform period. Figure 4 shows the same esti-
mation for damages, confirming the results of Table 4.
Figures 3 and 4 about here
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To test the robustness of our results further, we provide an array of validity tests for
the results on base costs. First, following DellaVigna and la Ferrera (2012), we run a set of
regressions using fake reforms dates, namely any day between 11 and 111 days before and
after the reform in order to stay su ciently far away to the true reform date. Basically, we
extend the period of interest to -200/+200 working days before the real reform date, since
the fake reform date could be at time -111 or at time +111. With these fake reform dates,
we do not expect to find any e↵ect like the one detected using the true reform date. Figure 5
shows the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the results of these 200 placebo tests,
normalized with respect to our baseline coe cient true specification reported in Table 3. We
expect only a few placebo estimates (i.e. not more than 5% in each tale of the c.d.f.) to be
larger than the baseline results. Figure 5 shows the result of this placebo test. None of the
results is larger than the baseline estimates in absolute value. This means that it is unlikely
that our result is produced by random chance as opposed to a causal relationship.
Figures 5 about here
Second, we explore whether the restriction of the case values to those between £1,000 and
£15,000 (i.e. “fast track” cases) a↵ected our main result. We compare that result with two
other restrictions: cases under £1,000 in value (i.e.“small claims”), and cases over £1,000 in
value (i.e. “fast track” and “multitrack” combined). The results are shown in Table B1 in
the Appendix. It seems that the impact of the reform had little e↵ect on claims run through
the “small claims” rules, whereas including multitrack claims along with fast track claims
appears to strengthen the size of the e↵ect somewhat. These results are supportive of our
main hypothesis: the change to the recoverability rules (which did not apply to small claims)
was a significant factor increasing legal costs.
Third, we also explore whether our results are sensitive to our restricting the analysis to
accidents alone. A second model in which all types of injuries are included is shown alongside
our core model for base costs in Table B2 in the Appendix. There is no evidence to suggest
that the inclusion of all injuries weakens the results (if anything they are slightly stronger).
This again is consistent with our main hypothesis as the recoverability rules applied to all
personal injuries. The justification for our initial restriction to accidents only was to reduce
heterogeneity, not to reflect the scope of the rules.
Finally, we seek to determine whether our findings are robust to alternative ways of
dealing with the fact that the rule change occurred on a weekend, when there are relatively
few accidents at work. In Table B3 in the Appendix, we compare the approach taken in
our core model (i.e. to exclude weekends and to set the reform date to be on the Monday
after the actual reform date - i.e. April 3rd) with two alternatives: (1) to exclude weekends
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but to keep the reform date as Saturday April 1st; (2) to include weekends, with the reform
date as Saturday April 1st. We find that, providing weekends are excluded, the results are
not very sensitive to whether the reform date is set at April 3rd or April 1st. The inclusion
of weekends, however, weakens the results (although they remain significant for the LLR
model and for the 7th polynomial). We suspect this indicates that the“thinness” of data at
weekends causes estimation problems, and tends to justify our initial method of dealing with
this issue.
5 Conclusions
The cost of litigation is important to both current and prospective claimants, defendants,
lawyers and, indeed, insurers and their policy holders; as such, it can have significant impli-
cations for the performance of the legal system in delivering e cient deterrence and e↵ective
compensation. These observations make litigation cost a legitimate focus for government pol-
icy and the issue has been central to a raft of measures from both the Government and the
Judiciary since the onset of recoverable success fees in 2000, up until the Legal Aid Sentenc-
ing and Punishment of O↵enders Act 2012. All of these measures respond to a widespread
sense that the costs (and the volume) of litigation have risen in recent years and we believe
that, in order to evaluate more recent initiatives, it is important to appreciate how past ones
have actually contributed to the current position.
The current paper argues that there is conceptual support for the hypothesis that the
operation of ‘no win, no fee’ (CFA) funding in England and Wales since 2000 was at least
partly responsible for the increases in the costs of civil litigation observed over that period.
In particular, we show that shifting the cost of success fees to defendants under CFAs weak-
ened monitoring incentives on the claimant’s side: the resulting moral hazard exacerbated
the externality implicit within the cost-shifting rule operated in England and Wales. This
therefore provided a natural experiment where a change in the degree of cost shifting was
observed within a single jurisdiction, and allowed the testing of one of the core hypotheses in
the literature on cost allocation rules: namely, the e↵ect on the amount of work done, and
charged for, by the claimant’s lawyer. Given the availability of individual claim level data
with high daily volumes of recorded accidents, we were able to use a regression discontinu-
ity design to test for the impact of the change in the rules, which took e↵ect for accidents
on or after April 1st 2000. The RDD findings are robust and consistent with the hypoth-
esis: our estimates suggest that the introduction of recoverability may have increased base
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costs (lawyers’ costs net of success fees) by about 25%.20 This constitutes the first empirical
analysis of the recoverability rules and, indeed, of cost-shifting in the UK.
Our results confirm to some extent the widespread concerns expressed by insurers, the
judiciary and others about the impact of recoverable success fees. Such concerns led to a
programme of policy interventions that sought to regulate the level of the costs that successful
claimants could recover in high volume, low value road tra c and employers liability cases (see
Fenn and Rickman (2011)). This began in 2003-05, was developed by the Ministry of Justice
in 2010, and had its scope widened to include higher value claims and public liability claims in
the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of O↵enders Act 2012, following recommendations
from Lord Justice Jackson (Jackson, 2009a,b). One of Jackson’s proposals, also implemented
in 2012, was that the recoverability of success fees should be reversed, for reasons based
on those underlying our paper. Our results lend support to this general direction of policy
to the extent that they suggest that costs had been rising without commensurate changes
in the nature of the cases they were funding. Our results also highlight potential dangers
in the “rush” (Jackson (2009a), para 5.12, p. 30) with which recoverability was originally
introduced.
Of course, while reversing the recoverability of success fees is intended to address the
weak monitoring incentives that we argue have characterized much personal injury litigation
since 2000, it will not solve the underlying cost concerns that arise from cost-shifting itself:
we saw these in Section 2 and our results lend empirical support for their presence. Thus,
in order to control the costs of litigation more generally, an issue remains about how to
deal with the externality inherent in cost-shifting. Here, a role for the regulation of costs
may remain, possibly along the lines of the approach that has developed since 2003 and into
the 2012 legislation. Our view, however, is that such regulation needs to take place against
a background of understanding about the behavioural e↵ects it may have, and a plan for
objective, empirically-based revision of the regulated costs over time (and evaluation of the
policy and its e↵ects); both of these would require suitable data collection and a mechanism
for cost revision. Neither is present in the current arrangements. Whilst adopting a broader
approach to cost regulation may help to reduce some of the piecemeal policy making we have
studied, failure to plan for systematic revision and evaluation runs the risk of reintroducing
it in years to come.
20Note that this impact on base costs relates to the experience of those claims resulting from accidents
just after the change in the rules. It is likely that a learning process took place with more experience of the
weaker incentives implied by the new rules, and therefore claims arising from later accidents may have had
even higher costs.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2: Outcome variables, descriptive statistics
Regime Regime
A B
Base Costs 2,003.635 2,159.053
(1,073.683) (1,120.737)
Obs. 487 414
Damages 3,563.542 3,296.565
(2,440.781) (2,138.318)
Obs. 487 414
Notes. The reported mean values are calculated on the sample of observation in a dis-
tance range from the reform day of 110 working days (i.e., from November 1st, 1999 to
September, 1st, 2000), for claims associated to accidental injuries with damages between
£1,000 and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. Actual values are in December 2010
Pounds, per accident. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Table 3: The e↵ect of Regime B on Base Costs, RD estimates
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 39
Panel A
Regime B 472.219** 471.259** 611.090*** 513.873**
(207.379) (207.372) (231.316) (212.705)
Weekday No No No No
Dummies
Panel B
Regime B 436.988** 435.683** 566.723** 531.813**
(207.559) (207.631) (234.307) (221.612)
Weekday Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Obs. 901 901 901 319
Notes. Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000 associated to damages between £1,000
and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. Only working days are considered (thus, h = 39 days around the reform
define the period from February 8th, 2000 to May 25th, 2000). RD estimates of the impact of the reform on Base Costs
defined as costs recovered in respect of accident. Estimation methods: spline polynomial approximation with 5th-order,
6th-order or 7th-order polynomial, and Local Linear Regression (LLR). Base Cost are per claim and in December 2010
Pounds. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 4: The e↵ect of Regime B on Damages, RD estimates
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 40
Regime B -7.507 -8.294 638.578 463.037
(456.686) (457.165) (510.480) (483.920)
Weekday No No No No
Dummies
Panel B
Regime B -52.245 -53.150 596.420 469.849
(442.602) (443.098) (501.439) (493.093)
Weekday Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Obs. 901 901 901 330
Notes. Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000 associated to damages between £1,000
and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. Only working days are considered (thus, h = 40 days around the reform
define the period from February 7th, 2000 to May 26th, 2000). RD estimates of the impact of the reform on Damages
defined as the agreed amount of damages in respect of accident. Estimation methods: spline polynomial approximation
with 5th-order, 6th-order or 7th-order polynomial, and Local Linear Regression (LLR). Damages are per claim and in
December 2010 Pounds. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table 5: The e↵ect of Regime B on Pr(Success), RD estimates
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 40
Panel A
Regime B 0.040 -0.004 -0.053 0.140
(0.262) (0.277) (0.315) (0.281)
Weekday No No No No
Dummies
Panel B
Regime B 0.067 0.024 -0.024 0.140
(0.267) (0.281) (0.321) (0.281)
Weekday Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Obs. 1,319 1,319 1,319 463
Notes. Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000, and with a duration of 730 days. Only
working days are considered (thus, h = 40 days around the reform define the period from February 7th, 2000 to May 26th,
2000). RD estimates of the impact of the reform on Success a dummy equal to 1 if the case is won by the claimant, and
zero otherwise. Estimation methods: spline polynomial approximation with 5th-order, 6th-order or 7th-order polynomial,
and Local Linear Regression (LLR). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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Figure 1: Trends in insurance companies’ expenditure on legal claims
Notes: Data on the vertical axis are in million of English Pounds. Data Source: Standard
and Poor’s SynThesys database.
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Figure 2: Density Test
Notes: McCrary Test of the continuity at the day of the reform of the number of reported
accidents per day. The central line is a spline 3rd-order polynomial fit in distance from
the reform day; the lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3: Base Costs
Notes: Test of the continuity at the day of the reform of Base Costs. The central line is a
spline 7rd-order polynomial fit in distance from the reform day; the lateral lines represent
the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of days and weeks
(black dots).
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Figure 4: Damages
Notes: Test of the continuity at the day of the reform of Damages. The central line is a
spline 7rd-order polynomial fit in distance from the reform day; the lateral lines represent
the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of days and weeks
(black dots).
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Figure 5: Placebo Tests for Base Costs
Notes. Placebo tests based on permutation methods for Base Costs. The figure reports
the empirical c.d.f. of the normalized point estimates from a set of di↵-in-disc estima-
tions at 100 false thresholds below and 100 false thresholds above the true threshold at
the reform date, 0 (namely, any point from day -111 and day -11 and any point from
day 11 to day 111). Estimation method: spline polynomial approximation with 5th-order
polynomial without covariates (upper figure) and with covariates (lower figure). Covari-
ates include weekdays dummies. The vertical lines indicate our benchmark estimate for
Base Costs from Table 3 (i.e., true coe cient normalized to 100) and its negative value.
The tests are run on an interval of +200/-200 working days from the true reform date,
which corresponds to the period from June 28th, 1999 to January 5th, 2001.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Variables Description
Variable Definition Measure
Base Costs The costs (i.e. fees) incurred on the case by fee-earners, Continuous
including time involved in preparation, December 2010 Pounds per claim
attendance at and travel to court,
writing letters and making phone calls,
but not including the success fees and ATE premiums
Damages The agreed amount of damages in respect of accident Continuous
December 2010 Pounds per claim
Success Equal to 1 if the case is won by the claimant, and 0 otherwise Dummy
Distance The distance of the date of the accident Days
from the date of the reform (April 3rd, 2000)*
Notes: *= Distance is calculated from the first week day after the reform, this is why rather than Saturday,
April 1st, we consider Monday, April 3rd.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we provide the results of the estimation of Equations 9 and 12 on
alternative samples as defined by each table title. Results in Table B3 use the original reform
date, Saturday April 1, 2000.
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Table B1: The e↵ect of Regime B on Base Costs for di↵erent subsamples defined
on the value of the claim
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 39
Panel A
Claims below £1,000 25.231 8.514 -36.124 -145.383
(152.539) (161.444) (192.752) (190.743)
Observations 113 113 113 42
Claims between £1,000 and £15,000 472.219** 471.259** 611.090*** 513.873**
(207.379) (207.372) (231.316) (212.705)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
Claims equal or above £1,000 602.413*** 604.631*** 745.722*** 607.230***
(219.473) (219.313) (238.507) (220.722)
Obs. 912 912 912 322
Panel B
Claims below £1,000 1.115 -22.928 -49.097 -142.144
(157.664) (162.916) (194.039) (203.712)
Observations 113 113 113 42
Claims between £1,000 and £15,000 436.988** 435.683** 566.723** 531.813**
(207.559) (207.631) (234.307) (221.612)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
Claims equal or above £1,000 549.651** 551.781** 679.324*** 601.882***
(218.078) (217.947) (239.830) (225.015)
Obs. 912 912 912 322
Notes. Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000 and with a duration of 730 days. Only
working days are considered (thus, h = 39 days around the reform define the period from February 8th, 2000 to May 25th,
2000). RD estimates of the impact of the reform on Base Costs defined as costs recovered in respect of accident. In Panel
A we do not control for weekdays dummies, while in Panel B we do control for weekdays dummies. Estimation methods:
spline polynomial approximation with 5th-order, 6th-order or 7th-order polynomial, and Local Linear Regression (LLR).
Base Cost are per claim and in December 2010 Pounds. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table B2: The e↵ect of Regime B on Base Costs on subsamples defined on the
type of injuries
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 39
Panel A
Only Accidents 472.219** 471.259** 611.090*** 513.873**
(207.379) (207.372) (231.316) (212.705)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
All Type of Injuries 484.567** 482.319** 678.072*** 557.935***
(206.058) (206.132) (228.753) (209.304)
Obs. 939 939 939 330
Panel B
Only Accidents 436.988** 435.683** 566.723** 531.813**
(207.559) (207.631) (234.307) (221.612)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
All Type of Injuries 444.424** 442.058** 629.400*** 575.806***
(206.557) (206.715) (231.529) (218.093)
Obs. 939 939 939 330
Notes. Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000 associated to damages between £1,000
and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. Only working days are considered (thus, h = 39 days around the reform
define the period from February 8th, 2000 to May 25th, 2000). RD estimates of the impact of the reform on Base Costs
defined as costs recovered in respect of accident. In Panel A we do not control for weekdays dummies, while in Panel B
we do control for weekdays dummies. Estimation methods: spline polynomial approximation with 5th-order, 6th-order
or 7th-order polynomial, and Local Linear Regression (LLR). Base Cost are per claim and in December 2010 Pounds.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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Table B3: The e↵ect of Regime B on Base Costs on subsamples defined on
weekends claims and with reform date April 1st
Spline Spline Spline LLR
poly 5th poly 6th poly 7th h = 39
Panel A
Excluding Weekends and Reform date April 3rda 472.219** 471.259** 611.090*** 513.873**
(207.379) (207.372) (231.316) (212.705)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
Excluding Weekendsb 466.953** 467.155** 606.898*** 613.404***
(206.636) (206.805) (230.072) (209.840)
Observations 912 912 912 318
Including Weekendsc 310.241 309.732 484.384** 424.956**
(196.371) (196.444) (220.765) (200.982)
Obs. 1,047 1,047 1,047 371
Panel B
Excluding Weekends and Reform date April 3rda 436.988** 435.683** 566.723** 531.813**
(207.559) (207.631) (234.307) (221.612)
Obs. 901 901 901 319
Excluding Weekendsb 429.160** 428.760** 569.837** 624.076***
(207.153) (207.286) (232.380) (213.738)
Observations 912 912 912 318
Including Weekendsc 273.565 272.506 446.117** 395.385*
(199.186) (199.248) (224.260) (208.417)
Obs. 1,047 1,047 1,047 371
Notes. a: Sample of accidents between November 1st, 1999 and September 1st, 2000 associated to damages between £1,000
and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. b Sample of accidents between October 28th, 1999 and August 30th, 2000
associated to damages between £1,000 and £15,000, and with a duration of 730 days. c: Sample of accidents between
December 13th, 1999 and July 19th, 2000 associated to damages between £1,000 and £15,000, and with a duration of
730 days (h = 39 days around the reform define the period from February 22nd, 2000 to May 9th, 2000). RD estimates of
the impact of the reform on Base Costs defined as costs recovered in respect of accident. In Panel A we do not control
for weekdays dummies, while in Panel B we do control for weekdays dummies. Estimation methods: spline polynomial
approximation with 5th-order, 6th-order or 7th-order polynomial, and Local Linear Regression (LLR). Base Cost are per
claim and in December 2010 Pounds. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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